Blog: madic50.blogspot.com /
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Paris, Friday, February 2,
2018
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REFLECTION ON THE DELEGATION
OF POWER WHAT IS THE RIGHT OF THE RETURN OF JIHADISTS
1. Preamble
The following discussion
concerns the public debate on the return of the French jihadists from the
Levant.
It is based on the
statements and representations of the lawyers of the above.
These actions of jurists are
taken here as the formalized expression of an opinion shared by sociopolitical
circles which develop their own politics at least since May 68.
However, the criticism of
these opinions does not in any way concern the merits of lawyers' professional
freedom of action.
1) - The geographical
absences of the right
1- The complaints
As it was predictable,
Wednesday, January 17, 2018, the jihadists' lawyers file a complaint against
the French State which opposes the return of these or claims to control the
flow.
These complaints were filed
on behalf of the "parents and grandparents" of the jihadist detainees
and their children.
2- The nonexistent
The lawyer Marie Dosé is
engaged on television. For her "Syrian Kurdistan is not a state and the
judicial institutions do not exist". The other lawyers involved share this
view.
As a result, say the lawyers
of the families of these French jihadists arrested by Kurdish fighters in
Syria: "These women and these children are all detained without right or
title".
This would be the case
because their place of detention, Syrian Kurdistan, is an area of
lawlessness. According to the French media expression, it would be a legal
void.
3- The transfer of fault
Syrian Kurdistan does not
exist so much that the French state is legally accountable for the arrests
committed by these non-existent.
By not demanding from this
incompetent organization Kurdistan that he immediately hand over the prisoners
illegally detained to the French "judicial institutions"; the French
State is guilty of "arbitrary detention" and "abuse of
authority".
Hence the complaints.
4- The judicial privilege
According to these lawyers,
this judicial non-existence of Syrian Kurdistan places the French government
under an obligation to assert its judicial privileges with regard to its
nationals.
These judicial privileges
consist of:
a- First to declare that
French law is superior to the local rights concerned.
b- This superiority is
essential for all French jihadists.
c- The government's
willingness to examine the return of jihadists "on a case-by-case
basis" is already a crime.
d- This hypothesis "is
already a form of arbitrariness which denies the principle of equality before
the law".
Why, indeed, would any one
benefit from the true right, in other words from French law, when such other
would remain in the emptiness of the barbarians' right?
f- Local states become
"zones".
5- Law and barbarism
For lawyer Dosé, the whole
procedure is subject to the rule of French privilege; that is, Western.
The idea of a trial
outside France, among the savages, is simply unthinkable, incomprehensible:
"and now we are talking about trials in Syrian Kurdistan".
The trial of an alleged
French criminal in the Levant, and then what else!
b- On the two ways of
considering that certain detainees can be judged by right on the place of their
alleged crimes (the "case by case" and the trial in the Middle East)
the judgment of Maitre Dosé is without appeal: "That n It does not make
sense, it's improvisation and incompetence. "
c- On the general question
of the existence, in this file, of a right in Syria or Iraq, outside the French
law, the sentence falls "One swims in delirium facing a historical
problem. "
d- Speaking on behalf of her
confreres and, at that time, support for the jihadists, she described the
statements made by the spokesman of the government as "extremely
worrying".
6- The colonial breed
a- Who can say the right?
Maitre Dosé: "For now,
the question is not whether they are really repentant or cheat, but to
repatriate them to be judged, It is our justice who will say who they are.
Arrest warrants have been issued, the charges have been started in France, where
anti-terrorist justice is anything but lax. "
b- The lesson
A supporter of the return of
the jihadists, the honorary commissioner Moréas became a lawyer, gives the
lesson of right that the world expected from France:
"Indeed, a terrorist
tried abroad, if he was acquitted, could no longer be prosecuted on French
soil. He could return home with impunity. This is apparent from Article 113-9
of the Penal Code: "No prosecution may be brought against a person
justifying that it has been definitely tried abroad for the same facts. Can a
foreign country be allowed to do justice for us? "
c- Commentary
Only French justice can say
the right.
Acquittal is a privilege of
French or Western courts.
Only the French justice can
judge French in violation abroad.
Conclusion: Who delirium?
2) - The criminal novelty
Jihadist crime differs from
ordinary crime not first by its cruelty, each of its acts is a war crime, but
first by its structure.
Jihadism is a continuous
global criminal journey where each sequence here prepares the other one
elsewhere.
Two examples:
1- The present
Ms Köning, whose
repatriation is requested, sent a message to her two children in France in a
video in 2013: "Do not forget that you are Muslim," she says. Jihad
will not stop as long as there are enemies to fight. "
2- The past
On his blog, the honorary
commissioner Moréas, fierce supporter of the "return" of the
jihadists, reports:
“We are in an inextricable
situation because, again, our leaders have been improvident: not one, it seems,
has thought about the post-victory. Yet we have already experienced this
situation ...
After the Dayton Agreement
of December 14, 1995, which ended the Bosnian war, foreign militiamen defending
the Muslim cause were asked to return home. Thus, a group of French, distraught,
but having tasted the power of arms, decided to help the "international
Islamist movement", which will later be referred to as Al Qaeda . They
join an international network that was set up around Fateh Kamel, who chose
Montreal for headquarters. Nine "ghosts" engage in robberies to
finance jihad. You do not have to give their name, but they are the first
French jihadists. When RAID police blast the door of their hideout in Roubaix,
they are greeted by gusts of Kalashnikovs. They fight back. The shot is fed. A
policeman has a perforated lung despite his bulletproof vest. The besieged are
unleashed. They scream "We'll never go! One of them throws a grenade from
the floor. The explosion ignites a mattress. The fire spreads quickly and the
house eventually collapsed. 1000 cartridges farther, firefighters will remove
four bodies from the rubble.
Survivors will be sentenced
to long prison terms. The investigation has highlighted the existence of a
large Al-Qaeda-linked network, and it is largely thanks to the evidence
gathered in France that other countries will become aware of the threat of
international terrorism and react accordingly. The dead did not teach us
anything.”
This story, as well as Ms.
Köning's statement, portrays the structure of jihadist crime.
3- It's globalized crime.
These people do not go to
fight in Syria because something is happening there.
They go there because it is
the place from which they can chase the fight against "the enemy".
At each trip, they may have
the strength to return, to travel, to renew, the terror and ensure its
propagation.
They did not go to Bosnia because there was a war. They went there because they could train in the war, transport it to other countries, including theirs, and maintain it.
In the long run, and the
more the better, it radically changes the judicial system for Terrorism.
4- The indispensable
procedural aggiornamento
It is no longer possible to
be in the judicial separation of states. The cooperation is itself rendered
obsolete.
a- Ordinary justice
The current system allows a
criminal to renounce crime by taking refuge in his country, which will not
extradite him.
This provision is
indispensable for ordinary crime. It usually makes national countries, said of
origin, back-bases of withdrawal for the completed, failed, lost offensives.
b- The jihadist diversion
Jihad uses these provisions
to make national countries places of reorganization of the forces to leave in
the terror in particular in the country of nationality.
What was to be a place of
abandonment of combat becomes a place of expansion of terror especially in the
country of withdrawal and protection.
National judicial criteria can no longer function in the same way with crime that is no longer "foreign" but "global".
c- Justice for jihad
Jihadism builds a global
judicial continuity.
The place of judgment must
be the one where the most significant crimes took place to produce this
enterprise of destruction of the states that is the Caliphate.
If these "foreign
militia" had been tried in Bosnia or sent back to Bosnia for trial, their
political situation would have been less popular, their criminality less easy
to expand and more easily controlled.
In the short term, either France (any other State) will accept that the other States concerned are parties to the lawsuit and that their legal requirements apply, or it will have to deliver its nationals to the most affected State by the action of this or that criminal of the Terrorist type.
This extradition of a
national to a country that was for him a place of jihad does not emerge from
ordinary extradition agreements but from the future functioning of ordinary
justice for terrorist crimes.
In a globalized criminal
journey that includes the country of nationality, national protection becomes a
complicity of states towards crimes committed against their own populations.
The globalized case, known
as the Roubaix gang, bears witness to this.
3) - The answers of law
The legal principles aimed
at disqualifying the Middle East courts on behalf of the law run counter to the
principles of law themselves.
A- Detention
The lawyers of the families
of these French jihadists arrested by Kurdish fighters in Syria ensure that
"these women and children are all detained without right or title".
If words make sense, lawyers
speak here of "detention" and not of judgment.
However, these people are
detained by right.
1- The Syrian Kurdish
Federation (called Rojaia, "the West" in Kurdish) or Syrian Kurdistan
is a fighting force recognized by the international community.
a- This fighting force leads
the war against a foreign invasion called "Islamic State" or
"Daesch".
b) The State in title is no
longer able to repel this invasion alone.
2- To challenge the Syrian
Kurdish Federation the right to make prisoners of war among the Daesh fighters
requires challenging the merits of the military opposition to ISIS.
3- Syrian Kurdistan holds the Daesch French rightfully and legally as prisoners of war.
a. This detention is all the
more lawful as it was desired by some of them.
b- They are alleged
prisoners of war criminals.
c- They must be detained until
handed over to a competent judicial authority to judge them.
The argument of detention
without right or title is therefore a professional misconduct.
B- Local competence or
international competence
1- The confusion
The lawyers of these
suspected adult criminals thus take for granted that the French State has
judicial capacities with regard to their arrested clients, and sometimes rather
received and then arrested, on the Kurdish territory of Syria.
This claim is based on a
failure in the distinction between the two types of French jihadists:
a- Those who have returned
to France and thus benefit from France's refusal to extradite its nationals.
b- Those who are still on
foreign soil and therefore mechanically dependent on the law in force in this
country.
The French justice can judge
its nationals present on its soil for crimes committed abroad but it can not
take the place of the local justices to judge French present on their soil.
Colonial law has been
terminated in law since 1946 and in fact since 1962.
2- Provision of prisoners
Syrian Kurdistan has no
right to try Daesh fighters since it is not a constituted state.
He has the right to take
prisoners but he does not have the legal capacity to try them.
For the same reasons that he
is not a State, he has no right to dispose of them, to hand them over to anyone
on his own, let alone to negotiate them politically or for other reasons.
He is just obliged to hand
them over to a competent judicial authority.
This is not based on the
alleged nationality of the perpetrators but on the place of commission of the
crimes.
3- Jurisdiction
The jihadists returned to
France can argue their presence on the soil of their nationality.
It is not obvious at all but
it is a current fact.
On the other hand, the
French jihadists prisoners of Kurdistan are on the scene of the commission of
the facts.
Jurisdiction is thus that of
the legally constituting States these places.
This local justice alone is
competent to judge the future of these prisoners of war presumed guilty of war
crimes.
Only she can legally
investigate, qualify, judge, pronounce.
Only an international
judicial body could replace it.
What would be "without
right or title" would be that Syrian Kurdistan voluntarily hand over these
prisoners to the French authorities.
This could be called
Trafficking in people.
C- The State
1- The Zone
The reasoning of the
jihadist lawyers is to say that the privilege of competence of the French state
stems from the absence of a local state. This one is also called
"zone".
The judicial incapacity of
the Kurdish military-political entity would be an illustration of this.
It's wrong. There is no
legal vacuum.
The existence in this region
of constituted, legal, recognized States is a fact. They were formed by the
Treaty of Versailles.
Apart from producing the
signature of another international treaty, these states are the only judicial
entities competent to judge crimes committed on their soil.
This exclusivity is
recognized for Iraq.
2- Syria
But if Syrian Kurdistan is
not a state it is first because no one wants to recognize this title. He
presents himself as a federal entity.
It is part of a sovereign state, recognized by the UN, which is the Syrian state.
It is up to the lawyers to
produce documents attesting to the non-existence of the Syrian state.
The existence of the Syrian
State and its functional juridical competence are recognized by all the
authorities, including academics, who have to deal with the subject:
"Rojava does not claim
to be a state in its own right but prefers to see itself as" a model for a
future decentralized system of federal governance in Syria ". For Fabrice
Balanche, geographer and specialist of Syria, it is rather "a parallel
administration alongside the Syrian administration".
"The Kurds are trying
to set up a real administration, but the Syrian regime still has control over
property titles or identity documents, for example,"
he told HuffPost.
"Kurdish neighborhood committees can settle small disputes, but this
jurisdiction is always in a higher Syrian jurisdiction". "
As long as this state is
recognized by international law, no one can judge crimes committed on its
territory in place of Syrian national justice.
D- The French State
1- State authority
Although the French
government does not recognize the cadres in office in the Syrian state, it has
no right to override the existence of a Syrian judicial authority and the
exclusivity of its jurisdiction over crimes committed in Syria. its
jurisdiction.
Moreover, he recognizes the
validity of Kurdistan's independent and armed administrative activity and
recognizes the legal primacy of the Syrian State and Justice over its own
activity.
Except to take advantage of
a military presence, and to rely on an outdated imagination of colonialism, the
French government has no right to override the qualified opinion of Syrian
justice.
The fact of being able to
conceal, by the circumstances, the existence and the primacy of this justice
does not remove anything from the power of this one or the flattery of those
who reject it.
After the crime still
injugated the action in Libya; the negotiation, merchandising and sale of the
fate of so-called French prisoners would complete the disqualification of
France in the region.
The action of the French
State can not be to circumvent the sovereignty or the exclusive jurisdiction of
these States.
2- The action of the French
State
The French state can not
follow the maneuvers of the French jihadists who were able to fight in Iraq and
come to Syria to be able to benefit from a French doubt regarding the capacity
of judgment of Syrian justice.
Given the war, the chaos, the accusations, the function of the French State is to contribute to determining by the international community, the UN, under what conditions and in what forms these recognized states and judicial institutions are represented on a case-by-case basis and work on the targeted crime.
In practice: to what
representation of the judicial authority should Kurdish fighters hand over the
jihadist prisoners of war they hold legally?
But participation in this
definition is diplomatic. It can not be a substitute for this competent
justice.
The French state must provoke
the presence of Syrian justice from the particular recognized provincial
administration of Kurdistan.
It must be distinguished
from the Turkish state that uses the military invasion to dictate to Syrians
the administrative organization of their state.
He must already say it
unequivocally and the rest will follow.
E- The distinction of places
of judicial affiliation
This quarrel of judicial
precedence does not answer the question raised by the specificity of the crime
of Daesh or Islamic State.
The government said it would
consider returning jihadists "on a case-by-case basis." This implies
that the "cases" are distinct.
1- The legal place of Mosul
Indeed, the jihadists did
not leave Syria or Iraq. They left to become ISIS combatant officials.
That these criminals
traveled through the conquests and expansions of the Caliphate, whether they
were here or there at the time of their arrest, is not necessarily the judicial
priority.
They subordinated themselves
to an armed and ideological group criminal, compact, disciplined, unified,
centralized, claiming for itself the title of State and whose center is Mosul.
The capital of this criminal group is in Mosul.
It was from Mosul that they
were required, placed, trained, armed, engaged.
It is up to the democratic
states to establish unequivocally that the legal capital, the center of
direction, thought, justification, rallying, of the Islamic State is Mosul.
2- The judicial consequences
The French jihadists did not
engage in "Syrian" or "Iraqi" movements with the usual
pathos of "national liberation"; as in the Spanish Catalan province
or the French department Corsica.
They are engaged as cogs of
a State whose primary function is conquest and precisely that of the world.
They can not personally get
rid of this attachment and select according to their will the acts that bind
them to this organization.
It's not for them to choose
the qualifications of their crimes. They are not competent to say whether they
are group fighters based in Syria or ISIS fighter officials whose capital is
Mosul.
It is not legally admissible
to claim that they are exclusively under Syrian justice on the sole ground that
their last duty station was Raqqa in Syria.
They can only distinguish
their actions from those of Daesh in the judicial process.
F- Affiliation a priori
A priori their legal
affiliation is as follows:
1- The jihadists are the de
facto officials of the Islamic State whose capital is Mosul.
2- These litigants were
arrested on Syrian or Iraqi territory as part of the exclusive military fight
against Daesch
3- They are therefore both:
a- Judicial procedures put
in place by the Iraqi state to try the factious criminals who privatized part
of the territory in view of conquests and that from the city of Mosul, Iraq.
b- Syrian State judicial
proceedings of which Syrian Kurdistan is an administrative entity.
4- The Iraqi State is
competent to judge all crimes committed by the jihadists of Daesch.
5- The Syrian state is
competent to judge the crimes committed on its territory by the Daesch
jihadists.
In these territories, the
French State has no rights other than the consular watch over its suspected
criminal nationals.
His only right is to request
that his nationals be presented to a competent court and contribute to his
determination.
The French state must
therefore ask the fighting authorities of Kurdistan to contact Syrian justice
and the Iraqi judiciary to organize the legal and complete legal action
vis-à-vis each of the so-called "French" prisoners.
And to begin with, judges
must determine if they are legally French.
G- The Tartuffes
These lawyers turn to the
courts and mobilize public opinion in the name of the defense of "equality
before the law" in favor of alleged war criminals in order to be able to
adjudicate formal offenses such as criminal conspiracy and the unlawful
departure.
This legal action is
presented publicly as a defense of human rights. In fact, it denies the
populations and States concerned the right to hold these suspected criminals
accountable.
It claims the defense of the
right. In fact, it denies the equality of justices, magistrates, according to
the place of the country in the scale of the world power.
None of these professionals
would require the extradition of a Frenchman who allegedly committed similar
crimes, or otherwise, in the United States.
While the death penalty is
enshrined in the laws and torture is in the judicial practice for cases of
jihadism.
This can only question the
approach of people who present themselves as the spokespersons of virtue.
4) - The path towards the
Delegation of Power
In this debate our gaze is
oriented towards Syria, "the complicated East".
However, the Levant is not
the only theater of this debate. The French scene is one of them.
By a trick of legal
conjuring, the jihadists come to France to be presented to its courts and come
out with a Delegation of Power.
1- Inversion
The legal or civil support
of the jihadists explain to us that France is required to demand the presence
on its soil of certain war criminals recognized as such and who want to destroy
it.
It must welcome them, under
the family, protect them, under the respect of human rights, justify them, in
the fight against the barbarism of gas users.
They would have made
mistakes, certainly, but first of all vis-à-vis France. Because their conduct
would not have respected the red lights posed by the French State.
It would be wrong, however,
to leave them in the hands of the legal representatives of their victims
because they are the barbarian leaders of countries that do not exist; or so
little.
These supporters of the
jihadists demand that the executioners escape their judges because they would
have had the merits to face them and that they would be the victims.
2- The French debt
The jihadists are not only
the victims of states and populations who have forced them to destroy cities
millennia.
The French jihadists also
went to Syria because they recognized the injustice they suffered in France.
It is for having experienced
discrimination, relegation, apartheid, that they left where they could gather
to live free and be respected as human beings and no longer animals as they are
treated more than ever before who stayed.
The French are in accounts,
in debt, late payment of compensation. The jihadists are also the bailiffs of
the Sharia.
3- The fault bleaching
Certainly, among their
supporters, no one asks that they come back to continue the fight. But no one
asks that they stop him, let alone answer them.
It is simply asked that it
be established by the French State that they do not come under the jurisdiction
of the Levant alone competent for the fight that they conducted there.
They want them to return to
France unscathed by any trial by local justice, any judicial qualification of
their criminality, any execution of sentence pronounced.
4- The correspondence of the
strategies
By most chance, this legal
strategy corresponds exactly to the jihadist strategy.
They obtain in the name of
the law, with the approval of the French State whose magistracy, three legal
devices:
A- Immunity for the facts
by:
a- The legal
disqualification of the State from the place of exercise of the Caliphate and
its judiciary,
b. The recognition of the
French incapacity to judge their alleged crimes since no one can seriously
investigate or qualify,
B- The legalization of the
course strategy. (The right to the criminal path)
a- The Caliphate is not a
local war. It's a world war.
b- By retaining the national
law to judge a world course, the French State in fact endorses the strategy of
the constitutive course of jihadism.
C- Complementarity
a- For the French State, the
ghosts are French who abandon the criminal fight in the Levant.
b- For the jihadists and
their supporters, the return is the legalization, the institutionalization, of
the right to the global criminal course.
5- Insertion
By bringing them back so
that they benefit from the judicial protection granted to any national, the
French State inserts the jihadist strategy into French law.
While the jihadists only go
to Syria to find the strength to return to destroy France, Europe, the French
state refuses to install a judicial chain to judge the jihadists where they
committed their most atrocious crime. , even the first crime.
He refuses to constitute a
chain of justice because he breaks the chain of the crime.
He states that it is not
continuous. He reserves to manipulate it, support it, justify it.
In doing so, he discusses
the right of jihadists to destroy a particular state. He shares with them the
concern to disqualify a particular state.
It recognizes their right to
act wherever they please and to seek refuge in their country of nationality.
6- Inequality of rights
a- Random control
The ghosts will be judged
only for minor French crimes and whose justification is not obvious.
It is indeed by no means
right to pretend to impede the freedom of movement, information, association,
idea and expression of these.
These are prohibitions that
have the duration of the balance of power.
b- Permanent superiority
On the other hand, they will
have come back by right in France.
They will have this right
under the superiority recognized by the French State of their status as French
in the jurisdictions of the countries in which their crimes are committed.
They will have caused the
French State to deny the disqualification of these states, called
"zones", and of the justices who bear their names.
7- The return guarantee of
the continuity of the departure
This return, the protection
against extradition thus offered to the ghost, the requirement to benefit from
it when one is in the "zone" of action, distinguish the right to
return from the abandonment of the combat.
The jihadists have neither
to denounce, nor to deny, nor to give up, to assert their right to return.
In this way, the return
formalizes a right to the continuity of the thought of departure.
The immediate problem for
the French is not that this thought of departure is criminal. First, it aims to
create a "return".
8- The civil consequences
The legalization of the
"return" by the jurists thus accompanies the strategy of the return
of the jihadists for two categories of people.
A- The ghosts
She accompanies him for the
ghosts that the French justice makes leave of their crimes in the Levant and to
which it can not pose conditions of abandonment of ideas and practices to
justify their presence in France.
B- Accompanying persons
She also accompanies him for
the support and accompaniment of jihadism.
a- The jihadists in title
have not been tried for their crimes in the Levant.
b- There is no reason for
them to be tried for the same crimes committed in France.
c- The suffering of the true
Muslims is the same. This is the only universal principle that is worth it.
9- The delegation of power
Admittedly, crime is
prohibited, as in the Levant, which is not a major obstacle for those who agree
to lose life or freedom.
On the other hand, the
criminal classification of the crime has been made debatable.
Informally, a jurisprudence,
even a legality, of the legitimacy of the jihadist course, and thus of its
legal bases drawn from Shari'a and political speeches, will have been installed
in the practices of the French State.
When we know that the French
state is unable to prohibit doctors from practicing in Burqa in Parisian
hospital consultations, we can imagine what it can be of its influence on the
most diverse activists.
The French are therefore
asked to welcome as their own Fascist combatants, such recognized war
criminals.
Moreover, this national
protection must be assured to them not at the end of their war but in the
course of it.
Return is the humanitarian
corridor through which jihadists can move from one continent to another and
continue to strike.
Returning, the jihadists are
not only haloed. They acquire a delegation of power. QED.
5) - Bis repetita
The reasoning behind these
support for the jihadists is well known to those familiar with the French
public debate.
1- The form
"movement"
The noisy mess of interests
and interventions that muffle the voices of the people of the Levant and the
victims of the Bataclan should not lead us to overshadow the action of a
specific European sector of public implementation of graduates and city
populations. They can become rural by transporting the city to the countryside.
This sector has occasionally
played a vital role in Europe for decades.
a- The most famous form is that
of "students of 68". Lately, she has embodied in "Catalan
independence".
b- She is the maneuver in the
claims of return of the jihadists.
It is not enough to say that
she is not alone in erasing her leading activist role.
2- Mechanics
The old men of May 68 have the
habit and the experience of this leftist logorrhea which functions with the
imperative of the imprecation, the anathema, the curse, in order to impose
Redemption.
Fifty years ago, it was
absolutely necessary, immediately, to organize the Civil War to purify the
society of the dictatorship of General de Gaulle and the Communists.
Fifty years later, the same
socio-political groups are again trying to force the French to give their
protection to adventurers who use the vocabulary of freedom and justice.
Today, as in the past, always
in the name of moral urgency and law, the same sociopolitical currents require
the French to save compatriots for the sole reason that they suffer and are in
grave danger.
The French would lose their
souls by appearing united with States full of blood.
b- They would save her by
extending their protective hand over her lost children.
c- They would have a debt
towards these fighters of which they refused to understand the fights and
drifts of which they are guilty.
3- The reality
a- It does not matter that
these people are worried about tracing the path of a fascist, slavery,
destructive fight.
b- In law, it brings us back to
colonialism, brings us into the Caliphate, imposes anarchism.
c- In practice, this solicitude
is the useful imbecility that accompanies the construction of the global
criminal path that is jihad.
6) – Conclusion
A government has many other
circuits of reflection than the common reality and we will see what will
happen.
Nevertheless, it is unthinkable
that today French executives claim to organize the judicial policy of France
around the archaism of the inequality of principle of magistrates and
litigants.
Some magistratures would be
unable to judge certain litigants.
It is this view publicly
supported by jihadist lawyers that is stated by Mr. Moréas, police commissioner
and lawyer:
"It is therefore the law
of December 21, 2012, the first of the many anti-terrorism laws taken under the
five-year term of François Hollande, which has driven the point: the French or
French residents must be tried in France.
It is therefore up to the
courts to request the extradition of these Frenchmen. It's that simple. "
What is simple and universal is
the suppression of Privileges law on August 4, 1789.
1- The "foreign"
courts are competent to try the criminals present on the ground where they have
officiated.
2- On the other hand, the French courts do not have the right to judge the mentally ill. They have to hand them over to psychiatry.
a- The silence which is made at
this moment establishes that the jihadists are not crazy.
b- They can always find who
will be as usual the place of negotiations between organized criminals and the
State.
Marc SALOMONE
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