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Paris, Sunday, December 17,
2017
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1- President of the French
Republic
2- European Commission
3- UN
4- Embassies: Australia, North
Korea (Bern), South Korea, China, European, Japan, Russia, USA.
5- Speakers of Parliament and
French parliamentary groups
REFLECTION ON COMMENTS ON KOREA
BY MONSIEUR GUTERRES, UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 14 December 2017.
See previous posts on
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1-11.08.17
2- 29.08. 17
3- 03.09.17
4-5.09.17
5- 10.09.17
6- 15.09.17
7-18.09.17
8-20.09.17
9 to 23.09.17
10-24.09.17
11-28.09.17
12-9.10.17
13-12.12.17
REFLECTION ON COMMENTS ON KOREA
BY MONSIEUR GUTERRES, UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 14 December 2017.
1) – Sleepwalking
On Thursday, December 14, 2017,
during a visit to Tokyo, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said, "The
worst thing that could happen is that we go into sleepwalking in a war that
could have dramatic circumstances. "
It is the expression of the
Australian historian Christopher Clark devoted to the causes of the Great War
of 1914.
This historian does not analyze
the causes of war but the final mechanics that makes it fatal.
It is the entanglement of
incompetence, skimpy calculations, self-esteem, and self-talk that has
liberated the space in which military violence has unleashed primordial
antagonisms.
These people did not want the war itself, at least not that one.
They simply made impossible the
rational examination of any other solution to the insoluble problems of the
moment. They
asphyxiated the intelligence.
The Secretary-General warns the
international community of the risk of such entanglement of the good reasons for
collective blindness.
This warning leads to the
following reflection.
2) - The status quo
As in 1914, the retaining bar
of this disaster rush is the affirmation that institutional action is aimed at
maintaining what is.
We mobilize for the status quo and
nothing must change.
This time, we give ourselves
the illusion of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In fact, the words serve to hide the fact that this opposition is not aimed at the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons but at the novelty of their possession by North Korea.
Again and again under the guise
of the maintenance of order establishes, one refuses to name the changes that
produces this status quo.
Indeed, North Korea also wants
the status quo. But
by giving itself the means to make it perennial, it upsets the equilibrium.
These balances are in
motionless appearances and in reality they are dynamic.
This reversal of balances is
therefore a consequence of the operating rules of the Armistice of Panmunjeom,
of July 27, 1953.
3) - The dynamic equilibria
The Armistice notes the
impossibility for each of the military-political camps to unify Korea under its
dictatorship.
He confines the two
military-political camps in two distinct parts of Korea.
b- It sets them as a function
and duty to manage their camp and prepare for reunification.
c- Without the inadequacy of
one camp to another the unity would have already been realized.
Reunification is therefore a
policy and implies an inevitable subordination from one side to the other.
The official reasoning of the
Powers concerned is that North Korea would unnecessarily add an unconventional,
exceptionally dangerous weapon to a conventional arsenal sufficient for the
Armistice to continue peacefully organizing the division of the country.
Therefore, international action
would consist in forcing North Korea to abandon its nuclear enterprise declared
moot and return to the status quo of the two Koreas managed by conventional
weapons without any direct danger to others.
Except that the mechanics of
the Armistice is not that of immobilism.
As long as both sides were
observing each other with conventional weapons, every hope was allowed for each
of them to subvert the other for its own benefit and to appear as the only
legitimate Korea.
By mastering the atomic weapon,
North Korea makes this reunification impossible for the benefit of the
military-political camp of the South.
At the same time, it raises
legitimate concerns on the part of South Korea to see this weapon accompany a
policy of reunification for the benefit of the North.
The stir caused by the
accession of North Korea to the atomic weapon comes as much from the rupture of
the balance of the two camps to its profit as from the impossibility for the
camp of opposite to break it to the his
profit.
Consequently, any policy of
giving up a camp, of the means it uses to fulfill this function and this duty
assigned to it by the Armistice, amounts to renewing the ante military
confrontation.
As the War of 14 was a European
World War, a new Korean War would be a kind of Asian World War; The
atomic weapons, Korean, Pakistani, Chinese, American, Indian, Russian, and
more.
4) - The UN Mediation
To open up the
"dialogue" necessary for the promotion of peace, Mr. Guterres
formulates a requirement "We are available, but we can only mediate when
both parties agree to our mediation".
He could develop this point of
view by defining the modalities of his "mediation" in terms
acceptable to both parties and useful for peace.
The Secretary-General says,
"Dialogue must have a purpose and the goal for us is to achieve the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula peacefully."
It is impossible to achieve
this goal without first addressing the questions to which nuclear power is an
answer.
To do this, the
"mediation" of the United Nations must begin with an examination of the
questions posed by the Armistice signed under the authority of the United
Nations and the reason why the "two parties" make a continual
reference to it. sixty-five
years after his signature.
1- States
a- These two camps have each
built a separate state for the purposes of international coverage.
These states are always the
masks of these camps.
c- States must dominate the
Camps and not the other way around.
2- Reunification
a- As long as these states are
hostages to the camps that produced them, they will be prisoners of the
Armistice system and in particular of the reunification policy.
b- The emancipation of these
States with regard to the camps passes by the renunciation of the policy of
Reunification.
c- This absorbed the cultural
ties of the two Koreas. It is, however,
distinct from it.
5) - The solution of the
Treaties
The function of the UN is to be
the place of resolution of the evolutions led by the Armistice.
1- The two states
If by treaty, the two states
recognize themselves as sovereign vis-à-vis the camps that built them and if
they renounce any policy of reunification, the aggressiveness of one to the
other loses all foundation political
and legal.
2- Supports
From there, it is possible to
obtain state circles of these two states that they also renounce by Treaty any
policy of participation in any reunification.
3- The NPT
On this basis, the examination
of the two Koreas' inscription in the NPT becomes all the more plausible as
both parties were signatories to it.
6)- Conclusion
The Secretary-General of the
United Nations says he is "ready to go anywhere, anytime, when it's
useful" and he says, "Meetings only make sense if they have a reason
to 'be. "
He can create this "raison
d'être" by erasing the appearances of immobilism of the Armistice of 1953
and by registering its mediation in the effective dynamism of this one.
It can therefore accompany the
installation of the legal supremacy of these two states and leave the Korean
culture to those who practice it.
It will be able to achieve the
goal of the United Nations as to the updating, by the two States, under its
High Authority, of the signing of the NPT already mastered by "both
parties".
Marc SALOMONE
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